Brussels Isn’t a Branch Office of Washington’s Internet Policy

As the European Union and the United States edge closer to concluding a new trade agreement, a critical but under-the-radar debate is unfolding — one that could reshape Europe’s ability to govern the internet on its own terms.

According to recent reports, the U.S. is pushing to include a ban on the introduction of so-called “network fees” — payments that European telecom operators want large content providers like Netflix, Google, or Meta to pay for delivering data over their networks. The idea is not new. Branded as “fair share,” it has been part of a sustained lobbying effort by Europe’s biggest telecom operators to shift some of their network costs onto content providers under the guise of infrastructure investment.

On the surface, Washington’s push to ban these fees might appear aligned with longstanding net neutrality principles. But this move carries real risks — not only to the open internet, but also to Europe’s digital sovereignty and policymaking autonomy. A blanket ban inserted into a trade deal would effectively short-circuit Europe’s ongoing democratic debate and lock in a specific policy outcome without proper scrutiny or accountability.

Let’s be clear about one thing: the current internet interconnection system is not broken. Based on commercial agreements for transit and peering, it is a decentralized, efficient, and self-regulating model that has underpinned the global expansion of the internet for decades. It allows networks — large and small — to connect and exchange traffic without regulatory micromanagement. It supports resilience, competition, and innovation, all without the need for heavy-handed intervention.

As I’ve argued, the problem lies not in the structure of the interconnection system, but in how some powerful telecom operators exploit their “termination monopoly” — their control over access to end-users — to demand fees from content providers, distorting competition and undermining openness. These efforts are often framed as necessary cost-sharing arrangements. In reality, they are rent-seeking strategies designed to extract value from parts of the ecosystem telecoms neither build nor operate.

The reason we’re stuck in this endless loop over network fees is the European Commission’s own doing. Despite overwhelming pushback from civil society, regulators, smaller operators, and much of the industry, the Commission keeps breathing life into a debate that only Europe’s largest telecom incumbents still want. Instead of listening to the broader stakeholder base, it continues to lean into the telco lobby—recycling policy proposals that, however repackaged, all point to the same destination: appeasing big telcos. The latest iteration? A proposed dispute resolution mechanism for IP interconnection—yet another attempt to manufacture a problem in order to justify a fix no one else asked for.

A recent study, “Exploring the negative impacts of legally mandated dispute resolution in IP interconnection,” casts serious doubt on the idea of introducing a legally mandated dispute resolution mechanism for IP interconnection. While such mechanisms might sound reasonable in theory, the study warns they are ill-suited for a dynamic, highly technical, and fast-evolving environment like internet interconnection. Forcing regulatory intervention where commercial negotiations already work efficiently risks slowing down resolution times, distorting market incentives, and inviting strategic gaming by dominant players. Worse, it could set a precedent for unnecessary regulatory overreach, undermining the voluntary, flexible arrangements that have allowed the internet to scale and remain resilient. Rather than solving real problems, a dispute resolution mandate risks inventing new ones.

Europe’s current system works well without top-down intervention. It is characterized by flexibility, transparency, and low barriers to entry — a stark contrast to the rigid, rent-extractive model that “fair share” advocates are promoting.

So why is the U.S. stepping in now? While the move may be framed as supporting an open and competitive internet, it’s less about principle and more about preserving the interests of U.S.-based companies. Rather than reflecting any consistent commitment to net neutrality—which has seen sharp reversals in U.S. policy over the years—it reveals a more troubling dynamic: Washington attempting to lock in its digital policy preferences through trade. Including a ban on network fees in a binding agreement may serve U.S. commercial interests, but it comes at the expense of Europe’s regulatory autonomy—imposing external limits on a debate that European institutions, stakeholders, and the public are still actively engaged in. This is not digital cooperation; it’s digital preemption.

This is part of a broader pattern. Too often, Europe finds itself negotiating from a defensive position in transatlantic digital diplomacy — reacting to U.S. policy moves rather than advancing a coherent agenda of its own. From data flows to platform regulation, Washington and Brussels are increasingly out of sync, with the U.S. pushing for lighter-touch frameworks while the EU builds a rights-based digital single market. There’s no shame in disagreement. But there is risk in preemptively locking in policy choices through trade instruments before democratic processes have run their course.

Europe must resist this temptation. The European Commission must reject the flawed logic of network fees once and for all. It is time. But it must do so on its own terms, through transparent policymaking that reflects the will of its citizens, not through the fine print of a transatlantic trade deal.

If we want to keep the internet open, we must also keep policymaking democratic. That means rejecting telco rent-seeking disguised as reform — and resisting U.S. overreach that threatens to outsource Europe’s digital future.
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The stakes are not just technical. They are political. Europe’s digital sovereignty depends on it.