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In a controversial move that could reverberate across Europe, Italy’s communications regulator AGCOM has decided to bring Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) under the scope of the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC). By classifying CDNs as Electronic Communications Networks (ECNs), AGCOM is effectively applying telecom-style rules — including mandatory registration and regulatory oversight — to a critical layer of the internet.
This isn’t just a technical tweak. It’s a fundamental shift in how internet infrastructure is treated, and it threatens to undermine the openness, resilience, and global interoperability of the internet as we know it. Telecom Lobbying Behind the Scenes The move appears closely aligned with Telecom Italia’s interests. TIM CEO Pietro Labriola was quick to praise the decision, calling it “a turning point” for the telecom sector and a step toward “a level playing field.” But it’s hard to ignore the timing — TIM had been lobbying for this very outcome just months earlier. Under the new rules, any entity that owns or operates a CDN in Italy — whether a global provider like Cloudflare, Akamai or AWS or a local content platform running its own caching infrastructure — will be required to obtain a general authorization and submit to AGCOM’s oversight. This, AGCOM claims, brings “symmetry” to digital regulation. In reality, it imposes heavy-handed controls on infrastructure that has long operated efficiently, securely, and competitively in a lightly regulated environment. The Opposition Was Loud — and Ignored This decision wasn’t made in a vacuum. During the public consultation phase, a wide range of stakeholders — from industry groups to civil society and technical experts — warned AGCOM against such a move. Their message was clear: regulating CDNs like telecom networks would create legal uncertainty, hinder performance, and fragment Europe’s digital ecosystem. AGCOM pushed ahead anyway, citing legal and technical justifications that stretch the definitions in the EECC and lean on precedent from the DAZN case — where the regulator treated the company’s private CDN as a public network because it included “active network elements” and fiber transmission. Why It Matters — And Why It’s a Mistake At first glance, this may seem like a narrow regulatory clarification. But beneath the surface, AGCOM’s decision sets a dangerous precedent. 1. A Backdoor for “Fair Share” Fees Despite AGCOM’s claims to the contrary, reclassifying CDNs as ECNs inches Europe closer to the controversial “fair share” proposal — the idea that big tech companies should pay telecoms for using their networks. By framing CDN infrastructure as public networks, the groundwork is laid for regulators to impose usage-based charges, turning voluntary interconnection into a regulated cost center. 2. Undermining Internet Architecture CDNs are not telecom networks. They’re content-layer infrastructure — crucial for speeding up access to web services, securing traffic, and ensuring resilience during spikes in demand. Regulating them like telcos breaks the open architecture of the internet, replacing flexibility and permissionless innovation with licenses and red tape. 3. Innovation Punished, Incumbents Rewarded This move could impose a significant burden on smaller companies and startups. Many content providers run their own CDNs or rely on third-party services to deliver high-performance content. Applying telecom-style rules could deter them from investing, hamper performance, and drive up costs — all while reinforcing the market power of large incumbents who can afford the compliance. 4. Market Distortion AGCOM’s decision blurs the line between transport and content layers. Telecom operators that offer CDN-like services could gain an unfair edge over independent CDN providers, raising serious concerns about competition and conflicts of interest. Instead of fostering innovation, this risks entrenching vertically integrated telcos and reducing user choice. Real-World Consequences If global CDN providers like Akamai, Cloudflare, or Fastly decide that Italy has become too burdensome or hostile an environment in which to operate — due to increased regulatory costs, data localization demands, or forced revenue-sharing with telecom operators — the impact will be immediate and widespread. These content delivery networks form the invisible backbone of the internet, ensuring that websites load quickly, remain secure, and stay online during high traffic. Their absence won’t just inconvenience tech companies — it will affect ordinary Italians in their daily lives. Critical public services —including Italy’s National Institute for Social Security (INPS), Agenzia delle Entrate (the revenue agency), and the Ministry of Health, to name a few—rely on CDN infrastructure to handle the surge of digital traffic during tax season, health emergencies, or pension disbursements. Without that infrastructure, websites may load more slowly, crash under pressure, or become more vulnerable to cyberattacks — leaving citizens stranded when they most need access to essential services. This isn’t just about efficiency — it’s about national resilience. Slower, less reliable digital infrastructure risks degrading public trust in government, hampering Italy’s digital transformation goals, and exacerbating the digital divide between urban and rural areas. The only real winners here are telecom operators, pushing for laws that let them charge the very companies that keep the internet fast, secure, and functional. If they succeed, global CDN providers may scale back or exit the Italian market, and telcos will likely hike consumer prices under the pretense of "infrastructure investment." In reality, Italians would pay more for a slower, less secure internet. By prioritizing their own content delivery networks, telcos are tilting the playing field in their favor — but their CDNs simply aren’t built to deliver the same quality. Unlike global providers like Cloudflare, Akamai, or Fastly — which operate expansive, highly distributed networks designed for speed, redundancy, and resilience — telco-run CDNs often lack the geographic scale, technical sophistication, and cybersecurity capabilities to manage peak demand or mitigate attacks. The consequences are not hypothetical. In June 2021, a major outage at Fastly — one of the world’s leading CDN providers — briefly took down or disrupted access to thousands of websites globally, including major Italian services such as La Repubblica, Corriere della Sera, and various e-commerce and government portals, highlighting just how dependent modern digital infrastructure is on these networks. Now imagine that level of disruption becoming routine because the country has driven out the providers best equipped to prevent it. Services like INPS or the Agenzia delle Entrate could become unreliable during critical periods, such as tax deadlines or pension disbursements, affecting millions of citizens. This isn’t just a matter of commercial competition. It’s a fundamental threat to Italy’s digital resilience. Favoring telcos' inferior infrastructure is digital protectionism — shielding incumbents from competition while degrading the experience, security, and rights of everyone else. This is not a future anyone should want. Undermining the open, efficient, and secure functioning of the internet in Italy risks isolating the country digitally and economically — while lining the pockets of a few national incumbents at the expense of everyone else. What’s Next AGCOM has now passed its decision to Italy’s Ministry of Enterprise and Made in Italy (MIMIT) for implementation. Under Italian law, the regulation can be challenged in court within 60 days — and given what’s at stake, legal action seems not only likely but necessary. Europe is at a crossroads. It can either defend a decentralized, open, and resilient internet that fosters innovation and economic growth — or it can cave to pressure from powerful telecom operators and embrace a centralized, rent-seeking model that locks users into slower, more expensive, and less secure digital infrastructure. AGCOM’s decision may be cloaked in regulatory language, but its consequences are anything but abstract: they are political, economic, and profoundly structural. This is not just Italy’s problem. If left unchallenged, it risks becoming a dangerous blueprint for the rest of Europe — one that fractures the continent’s digital single market, weakens its cybersecurity posture, and erodes the fundamental principles that have allowed the internet to thrive. Italian policymakers need to understand the gravity of this moment. If they allow this regulation to stand, they won’t just be making a technical decision — they will be endorsing a future in which Italy is digitally isolated, its citizens pay more for less, and its economy loses out on global competitiveness. Time is running out — and silence now means surrender. Telecom giants are pushing to turn Italy into a laboratory for their rent-seeking agenda, using regulatory capture to undermine the open internet and crush competition. This isn’t about fairness or investment — it’s a calculated move to rewrite the rules in their favor, locking in profits while degrading the digital experience for everyone else. If lawmakers, regulators, and civil society don’t act now, Italy will set the precedent for a walled-off, telco-dominated internet that spreads across Europe like a virus. If we let this stand, we’re not just surrendering the internet — we’re auctioning it off. As the European Union and the United States edge closer to concluding a new trade agreement, a critical but under-the-radar debate is unfolding — one that could reshape Europe’s ability to govern the internet on its own terms.
According to recent reports, the U.S. is pushing to include a ban on the introduction of so-called “network fees” — payments that European telecom operators want large content providers like Netflix, Google, or Meta to pay for delivering data over their networks. The idea is not new. Branded as “fair share,” it has been part of a sustained lobbying effort by Europe’s biggest telecom operators to shift some of their network costs onto content providers under the guise of infrastructure investment. On the surface, Washington’s push to ban these fees might appear aligned with longstanding net neutrality principles. But this move carries real risks — not only to the open internet, but also to Europe’s digital sovereignty and policymaking autonomy. A blanket ban inserted into a trade deal would effectively short-circuit Europe’s ongoing democratic debate and lock in a specific policy outcome without proper scrutiny or accountability. Let’s be clear about one thing: the current internet interconnection system is not broken. Based on commercial agreements for transit and peering, it is a decentralized, efficient, and self-regulating model that has underpinned the global expansion of the internet for decades. It allows networks — large and small — to connect and exchange traffic without regulatory micromanagement. It supports resilience, competition, and innovation, all without the need for heavy-handed intervention. As I’ve argued, the problem lies not in the structure of the interconnection system, but in how some powerful telecom operators exploit their “termination monopoly” — their control over access to end-users — to demand fees from content providers, distorting competition and undermining openness. These efforts are often framed as necessary cost-sharing arrangements. In reality, they are rent-seeking strategies designed to extract value from parts of the ecosystem telecoms neither build nor operate. The reason we’re stuck in this endless loop over network fees is the European Commission’s own doing. Despite overwhelming pushback from civil society, regulators, smaller operators, and much of the industry, the Commission keeps breathing life into a debate that only Europe’s largest telecom incumbents still want. Instead of listening to the broader stakeholder base, it continues to lean into the telco lobby—recycling policy proposals that, however repackaged, all point to the same destination: appeasing big telcos. The latest iteration? A proposed dispute resolution mechanism for IP interconnection—yet another attempt to manufacture a problem in order to justify a fix no one else asked for. A recent study, “Exploring the negative impacts of legally mandated dispute resolution in IP interconnection,” casts serious doubt on the idea of introducing a legally mandated dispute resolution mechanism for IP interconnection. While such mechanisms might sound reasonable in theory, the study warns they are ill-suited for a dynamic, highly technical, and fast-evolving environment like internet interconnection. Forcing regulatory intervention where commercial negotiations already work efficiently risks slowing down resolution times, distorting market incentives, and inviting strategic gaming by dominant players. Worse, it could set a precedent for unnecessary regulatory overreach, undermining the voluntary, flexible arrangements that have allowed the internet to scale and remain resilient. Rather than solving real problems, a dispute resolution mandate risks inventing new ones. Europe’s current system works well without top-down intervention. It is characterized by flexibility, transparency, and low barriers to entry — a stark contrast to the rigid, rent-extractive model that “fair share” advocates are promoting. So why is the U.S. stepping in now? While the move may be framed as supporting an open and competitive internet, it’s less about principle and more about preserving the interests of U.S.-based companies. Rather than reflecting any consistent commitment to net neutrality—which has seen sharp reversals in U.S. policy over the years—it reveals a more troubling dynamic: Washington attempting to lock in its digital policy preferences through trade. Including a ban on network fees in a binding agreement may serve U.S. commercial interests, but it comes at the expense of Europe’s regulatory autonomy—imposing external limits on a debate that European institutions, stakeholders, and the public are still actively engaged in. This is not digital cooperation; it’s digital preemption. This is part of a broader pattern. Too often, Europe finds itself negotiating from a defensive position in transatlantic digital diplomacy — reacting to U.S. policy moves rather than advancing a coherent agenda of its own. From data flows to platform regulation, Washington and Brussels are increasingly out of sync, with the U.S. pushing for lighter-touch frameworks while the EU builds a rights-based digital single market. There’s no shame in disagreement. But there is risk in preemptively locking in policy choices through trade instruments before democratic processes have run their course. Europe must resist this temptation. The European Commission must reject the flawed logic of network fees once and for all. It is time. But it must do so on its own terms, through transparent policymaking that reflects the will of its citizens, not through the fine print of a transatlantic trade deal. If we want to keep the internet open, we must also keep policymaking democratic. That means rejecting telco rent-seeking disguised as reform — and resisting U.S. overreach that threatens to outsource Europe’s digital future. The stakes are not just technical. They are political. Europe’s digital sovereignty depends on it.  July has been a busy month for AI. Both the United States and China released their strategy action plans. Below is a comparative analysis of China’s 2025 Global AI Governance Action Plan (announced in Shanghai) and the 2025 America’s AI Action Plan (released in July by the White House), focused on how each superpower is defining the rules, priorities, and values for AI governance—and what this reveals about the emerging digital world order. Two Visions, One Technology: A Strategic Showdown in AI Governance Strategic Takeaways
1. AI as Geopolitical Infrastructure vs. AI as Economic Engine
The Bigger Picture: A Fracturing Digital Future The contrast couldn’t be starker:
This is more than a policy split—it's a confrontation between two rival digital world orders: one rooted in state sovereignty, the other driven by open innovation. Whether the world moves toward a bipolar AI governance structure or finds some space for hybrid models—especially in the Global South—will shape the next decade of geopolitics and global tech governance. In 2005, the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) convened in Tunis under the weight of a profound question: who should govern the Internet? As the Internet cemented its role as the backbone of global commerce, communication, and geopolitical influence, tensions escalated between those who had historically shaped its architecture and those who sought a greater role. At the heart of this debate was the United States’ entrenched influence over core infrastructure — particularly the Domain Name System (DNS) — juxtaposed with rising demands from countries like Brazil, China, India, and South Africa for a more equitable distribution of authority.
The summit concluded with a compromise that would shape the contours of this debate for years to come: the creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and a vague, enigmatic commitment to “enhanced cooperation.” While the IGF quickly established itself as the premier venue for multistakeholder dialogue, enhanced cooperation remained ambiguous—at once a promise of inclusivity and a battleground of competing visions. Nearly two decades later, this term lingers in diplomatic circles, elusive and unresolved, yet its endurance reflects a deeper tension that continues to animate debates over Internet governance: the unresolved contest between global multistakeholderism and sovereign multilateralism. Origins of an Ambiguous Compromise The term enhanced cooperation was conceived in the final hours of the WSIS negotiations, an eleventh-hour addition designed to salvage consensus amid ideological stalemate. The summit’s final document — The Tunis Agenda for the Information Society — articulated the term in Paragraph 69: “We further recognize the need for enhanced cooperation to enable governments, on an equal footing, to carry out their roles and responsibilities in international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet.” Crucially, the text omitted any definition of what such cooperation might entail or what institutional form it might assume. This ambiguity was not accidental. It was a diplomatic sleight-of-hand, allowing each faction to leave the summit with its vision ostensibly intact. Proponents of the multistakeholder model saw it as affirming their view of shared responsibility among governments, civil society, the private sector, and the technical community, while advocates of a stronger intergovernmental role interpreted it as a concession toward sovereign oversight. In effect, enhanced cooperation became a vessel into which opposing sides poured incompatible meanings. Post-Tunis Contestation and Institutional Paralysis In the aftermath of the 2005 WSIS, enhanced cooperation emerged as one of the most contested and misunderstood commitments in global Internet governance. Conceived as a way to ensure that governments could meaningfully participate in shaping international Internet-related public policy, it quickly became a diplomatic Rorschach test. For many Western democracies and industry stakeholders, enhanced cooperation was interpreted as a principle that could be fulfilled within existing multistakeholder processes. They saw no contradiction between distributed, inclusive dialogues and legitimate policy influence. In this view, forums like the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), with their open, bottom-up ethos, offered a sufficient—if imperfect—venue for cooperation among governments, civil society, the private sector, and technical experts. But to others, particularly in the Global South, this framing amounted to a sleight of hand. Enhanced cooperation, as they understood it, demanded more than inclusive conversation; it required concrete institutional change. Specifically, it meant rebalancing authority over Internet governance issues toward intergovernmental mechanisms—ideally under the auspices of the United Nations or the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). What Western actors saw as adequate, these states saw as evasion; what one side viewed as progress, the other read as stalling. This disconnect produced a structural impasse and rather than evolving into a shared project, enhanced cooperation became a site of diplomatic estrangement. Year after year, working groups and consultations rehashed the same arguments, with little movement. The two sides spoke different political languages, animated by divergent visions of legitimacy, sovereignty, and institutional power. Enhanced cooperation remained suspended—neither fully dismissed nor meaningfully realized. It became, in effect, a placeholder for deeper disagreements over who should govern the Internet, and how. The WGECs and the Failure to Define Attempts to break this disagreement emerged through the United Nations’ Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD), which convened two Working Groups on Enhanced Cooperation (WGEC)—first in 2012 and then again in 2016. Both groups were tasked with the same mission: to explore how to operationalize Paragraph 69 of the Tunis Agenda. Both failed. The first WGEC could not even agree on a working definition of enhanced cooperation, while the second produced extensive deliberations but similarly ended without consensus. Delegates entrenched themselves along familiar geopolitical lines, rendering the process incapable of delivering a shared vision. These failures were not simply procedural; they were symptomatic of deeper questions about legitimacy, authority, and power in the governance of the Internet. A Symbolic Battleground in a Changing Digital Order Today, enhanced cooperation functions more as a symbolic totem than a practical policy tool. For countries within the G77+, as well as advocates of digital sovereignty, it remains a rhetorical instrument—used to signal dissatisfaction with the current distribution of influence and to push for alternative models of governance. For others, particularly defenders of the status quo, it is a relic of a battle already won. Yet this status quo is far from stable. The multistakeholder model, while resilient, faces growing strain from multiple directions, including the rise of authoritarian digital governance models, the erosion of trust in private tech monopolies, the increasing balkanization of digital regulation, and the mounting challenges posed by artificial intelligence. In this context, the continued invocation of enhanced cooperation reflects the enduring salience of the core issue it represents: the tension between the sovereign authority of states and the transnational nature of the Internet. Toward a Constructive Reimagining The Internet of 2025 bears little resemblance to that of 2005. Its governance institutions have evolved, new actors have emerged, and fresh challenges—such as algorithmic accountability, data governance, and AI regulation—now dominate the agenda. In this new reality, the concept of enhanced cooperation also requires reimagination. To do so, it must first be liberated from the semantic battles and institutional baggage of the past. Attempts to define enhanced cooperation have proven fruitless. Instead of continuing to treat it as a definitional challenge or a monolithic project, it should be embraced as a dynamic, evolving process—one that accommodates a variety of formats, actors, and institutional experiments. It should be understood as a pathway for inclusion, particularly for those stakeholders who have felt marginal to Internet governance for the past two decades. This includes not only governments from the Global South, but also civil society, the private sector, academic, and technical actors from these regions. For many of them, enhanced cooperation has served as a conceptual entry point—an aspirational demand for greater voice, recognition, and parity in global digital policymaking. Their concerns must be taken seriously. A History in Motion In this broader view, enhanced cooperation is not a static concept frozen in 2005, rather an ongoing process—one that has unfolded through a series of institutional moments: the establishment of the IGF in 2006 and the past twenty years of global IGF meetings, the WSIS+10 review in 2015, the IANA stewardship transition in 2016, and more recently, the 2024 Global Digital Compact and the WSIS+20 review in 2025. Each represents an iteration of enhanced cooperation in action, whether formally recognized or not. Similarly, the expanding terrain of governance—encompassing data, platforms, content moderation, and AI—has generated new spaces for dialogue and decision-making: at the ITU, UNESCO, regional organizations, industry-led forums, and civil society coalitions. The proliferation of such venues suggests that enhanced cooperation is not a dead letter but a dispersed and pluralistic process already underway. Conclusion: From Roadblock to Resource It is time to stop viewing enhanced cooperation as a roadblock to Internet governance. Properly framed, it can serve as a bridge: enabling collaboration across geopolitical divides, promoting inclusive participation, and harmonizing policy approaches in an increasingly fragmented digital landscape. The goal should not be the creation of a new institution or the transfer of authority to intergovernmental bodies; rather, it should be to ensure that all stakeholders—especially those historically marginalized—can participate on equal footing in shaping the Internet’s future. Ultimately, enhanced cooperation remains one of the Internet governance field’s most misunderstood concepts. Yet beneath its ambiguity lies a powerful idea: that global collaboration on digital policy must reflect the diversity of its users and the complexity of its challenges. In this light, enhanced cooperation is not an obstacle to be overcome, but a resource to be cultivated—an underused tool for realizing a more inclusive and effective digital future. The long-awaited Elements Paper for the 20-year review of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) has finally been released—and, regrettably, it underdelivers. In UN parlance, an “elements paper” outlines the key ideas and proposals that form the backbone of a future declaration or outcome document. It is, in other words, the skeleton on which the final body of work is built. So its content matters.
This year’s WSIS+20 review unfolds in a world starkly different from the one that hosted the last review a decade ago. The geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically. Ideological divides have widened. The Internet itself has evolved—both technologically and politically—in ways that few could have predicted twenty years ago. Against this backdrop, the WSIS process is caught between legacy aspirations and new global fractures. The core question is whether a vision crafted two decades ago can still guide the next twenty years of global digital governance. The Good To its credit, the Elements Paper reaffirms the original WSIS vision of building a “people-centered, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society.” This people-first emphasis is not just symbolic—it is politically meaningful. Today, many initiatives on digital governance, including the UN’s Global Digital Compact (GDC), have leaned heavily into state-centric approaches. By contrast, WSIS has historically been broader in its focus—rooted in development, access, and equity. That framing still matters. Encouragingly, the paper also acknowledges persistent digital divides and the structural inequities that prevent entire populations from meaningfully participating in the digital economy. It recognizes the need to close these gaps and positions WSIS+20 as an opportunity to do so in coordination with the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. Another welcome inclusion is the explicit recognition that a global, open, and interoperable Internet is essential for achieving these goals. The paper rightly calls for collaboration “to prevent, identify and address risks of fragmentation of the Internet.” Still, the tone here is oddly subdued. Fragmentation is no longer a hypothetical threat—it is an ongoing reality with tangible impacts on people, businesses, and national economies. The final resolution will need to address this issue with far more urgency and clarity, especially as governments continue to drift apart on core principles like interoperability, trust, and openness. The Bad The most troubling aspect of the Elements Paper is how much it echoes the Global Digital Compact—a document many warned would end up overshadowing WSIS. That fear appears to have been justified. The sections around key issues like human rights, data governance, and artificial intelligence is majorly lifted from the GDC. Even its discussion of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF)—a central legacy of the WSIS process—borrows wholesale from the GDC: “The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) has become an established forum for discussion…”. This is more than lazy drafting; it suggests an inversion of influence. Rather than guiding the GDC, WSIS is being subsumed by it. Nowhere is this more evident than in the paper’s treatment of human rights. The document gives lip service to rights protections but ultimately weakens their prominence by leaning on language that accommodates governments—like China and Russia—that routinely invoke “national security” to suppress online freedoms. Paragraph 48 states: “International rights agreements permit restrictions on expression…provided that these are relevant, proportionate and established in law.” While technically accurate, this framing creates space for state overreach. Even more concerning is what’s missing: there’s no reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, nor any mention of the central role played by the UN Human Rights Council in digital governance. For a process rooted in rights-based development, this is a glaring omission. Furthermore, while the Elements Paper nods to the idea of aligning WSIS+20 and the GDC, it fails to explain what such alignment would look like in practice. WSIS has endured because of its agility and forward-looking nature. The GDC, by contrast, is narrowly focused on today’s crises. WSIS should not dilute its broader vision to accommodate a reactive, short-term policy process. It’s important to remember that the GDC exists because WSIS came first. The CSTD resolution offers thoughtful recommendations on how these two processes can be meaningfully aligned—but the Elements Paper largely ignores them. The Ugly The paper’s treatment of Internet governance is where it truly falters. Paragraph 59 proclaims: “The governance of the Internet should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society and international organisations.” While this may sound familiar—it echoes language from the 2005 Tunis Agenda—it is stripped of its original context. Worse, it subtly recasts Internet governance as a multilateral process rather than a multistakeholder one. This rhetorical shift represents a serious departure from two decades of practice and consensus, in which civil society, the private sector, and technical communities worked alongside governments to co-develop global norms and principles. Tellingly, the Elements Paper omits the WSIS-agreed working definition of Internet governance: “The development and application by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.” This definition should be reinstated in the Zero Draft as it has provided essential clarity over the years and continues to reflect the distributed nature of authority in the Internet ecosystem. The document also revisits the issue of “enhanced cooperation”—a long-standing source of controversy stemming from vague language in the Tunis Agenda. Two UN-convened Working Groups on Enhanced Cooperation (WGEC), in 2013 and 2016, were tasked with clarifying how governments might play a greater role in shaping Internet-related public policy. Both failed. Political divisions—particularly between those favoring state-led models and those defending multistakeholderism—led to deadlock. Neither group produced substantive recommendations, only compilations of competing visions. Given this history, one has to ask: what makes us think the deadlock can be overcome now, especially in today’s even more polarized geopolitical environment? Here’s the truth: the debate around enhanced cooperation is outdated—and arguably resolved. It was effectively realized through the 2016 IANA stewardship transition, in which the U.S. government relinquished control of core Internet functions to the global Internet community. The GDC process further demonstrates that governments are, in fact, cooperating—sometimes uncomfortably—with other stakeholders to shape digital norms. To rehash this debate now is to miss how far we've already come. Conclusion WSIS’s founding vision—to build a people-centered, inclusive, and development-oriented Information Society—remains as vital as ever. But keeping that vision alive means more than reciting familiar language. It requires political courage, clarity of purpose, and institutional memory. The Elements Paper, as it stands, risks undermining twenty years of progress by relitigating settled debates, downplaying human rights, and allowing newer processes like the GDC to eclipse the enduring relevance of WSIS. The Internet is facing real threats—fragmentation, censorship, inequality—and the institutions tasked with safeguarding it must meet the moment. That means reaffirming the multistakeholder approach, placing human rights at the center, and ensuring that the next twenty years of Internet governance build on, rather than abandon, the hard-earned lessons of the past. On April 25, civil society organizations and consumer advocates filed a complaint against Deutsche Telekom (DT) with Germany’s Federal Network Agency. According to the complaint, Germany's largest network provider does not treat all online services equally, but instead, DT is artificially slowing down the network and only allows unrestricted access for a fee. The complainants argue that DT is breaching net neutrality principles by forcing online services to pay for proper delivery across its network; services that do not pay would experience degraded or even blocked access. The complaint raises a democratic concern, warning that this model allows large players to buy broader reach and visibility, distorting fair access to information and undermining diversity of opinion online.
This is not the first time, Germany’s, and Europe’s, largest telecoms operator is violating network neutrality. In 2013, Deutsche Telekom announced plans to throttle internet speeds for users exceeding certain data limits, while exempting its own services from these restrictions. The move was criticized for violating net neutrality principles. In the end, the Cologne Regional Court ruled against these throttling clauses, leading Deutsche Telekom to remove such provisions from its contracts. Then, in 2017, Germany’s Federal Network Agency declared that DT’s “StreamOn”, its controversial zero-rating tariff option, partially violated net neutrality rules. The case made it all the way up to the European Court of Justice, which, in 2021, eventually ruled that Deutsche Telekom's "StreamOn" offer violated EU net neutrality regulations. The service allowed unlimited data streaming for certain content providers without counting against users' data caps, which was deemed discriminatory against other services. Three years later, in 2020, DT again thought it was appropriate to take advantage of the world’s worst pandemic to exploit its users. The German Research Network (DFN), anticipating an increase in traffic due to the shift in online lectures because of COVID, requested to peer – i.e. exchange traffic – directly with Germany’s telecoms champion. DTdenied, resulting in a “chargeable global upstream”. The end result was unnecessary bottlenecks that degraded the users’ experience, at a time when Internet connectivity was vital for the continued and smooth functioning of societies. And, then again, in 2024, DT was accused of creating artificial bottlenecks by not adequately expanding its network interconnection capacities, allegedly pressuring content providers to pay for better access. Specifically, Meta (formerly Facebook) decided to reroute its data traffic through third-party providers to avoid fees imposed by Deutsche Telekom, leading to a much-publicized legal dispute. These instances highlight ongoing tensions between DT’s business practices and net neutrality principles. While the exact number of violations is not specified, the recurring nature of these issues indicates a concerning pattern. The thing to understand is that all this is happening in the midst of a debate in the EU that now counts more than three years. In 2022, the CEOs of Deutsche Telekom, Telefónica, Vodafone, and Orange published an open letter, calling “for large content platforms to contribute to the cost of European digital infrastructure that carries their services.” Claiming that the current situation is “not sustainable” for their companies, they argued that “Europe will fall behind” if this situation is not addressed. Having the blind support of former Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton, their idea went as far as it could before it got stricken down by Europe’s entire digital ecosystem, including academics, civil society organizations, start-ups, the European Broadcasting Organization, Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO), the European Consumer Organization, the European Internet Exchange Association, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, and even the majority of member states. The list goes on… You could ask, why are we still discussing this then? There are different reasons a bad idea that could have severe consequences to Europe’s competitiveness and future as a digital market continues to persist. One reason is the legitimate dissatisfaction about aspects of big tech – content moderation and competition issues in particular, which telcos have used as a stepping stone to push for their own agenda. Another reason is the fact that telcos have always disliked the Internet and the disruption it has caused to their termination monopolies. And, then there is also the fact that telcos have not as much as they could do with regards to connectivity and infrastructure investment and this reality is catching up with Europe’s digital needs. In all these, the common denominator is European telcos. Under pressure from telcos, therefore, the EU Commission is trying to find a way to appease them. The EUCommission's White Paper "How to master Europe's digital infrastructure needs?", released last year, lays the groundwork for a comprehensive reform of the EU's telecom and digital infrastructure landscape. It aims to address challenges in achieving the EU's Digital Decade 2030 targets by proposing the development of a Digital Networks Act (DNA). A significant aspect of the White Paper is its consideration of extending certain telecommunications regulations to encompass content and application providers, including cloud service providers. This includes discussions around access obligations and dispute resolution mechanisms. The idea of a dispute resolution mechanism is another way telcos have been trying to upend network neutrality rules and change the interconnection regime in Europe. It is an idea borrowed from the publishing world, where various countries, including Australia, Canada and France have mandated big technology companies to enter secretive negotiations with big publishing houses. And, although these policies have been in effect for some time now, little is known about their effectiveness. Existing research alludes to the fact that there is “ambiguity as to why some news publishers receive funding and not others, and [there are] concerns about a hierarchy among news businesses between the most powerful who are able to negotiate deals, and others who are set aside. In general, there are concerns about a lack of transparency in the bargaining process.” Now, replace “news publishers” with “telcos”. DT claims that they care about the open Internet, about users and Europe. Respectfully, I don’t think so. Only a couple of months ago, DT’s CEO, made the tone-deaf claim that Europe needs a DOGE department. Yes, you heard correct. Even if we put aside the privacy violations, administrative procedure breaches, and unprecedented challenges to established legal frameworks governing federal information security that DOGE has created, the fact that DT issuggesting something like this, points to a much larger issue: telcos will stop at nothing in order to get their own way. Europe has a functioning interconnection market and it is one of the last beacons of hope for the open Internet, especially considering the unpredictability of the current US administration. Additionally, as Europe continues to champion free trade, this can only be achieved through the open, global and interoperable Internet because the open Internet eliminates many of the traditional barriers to commerce by enabling unrestricted access to global markets, information, and communication. Any proposal – direct or indirect – that attempts to undermine network neutrality will also undermine any chances for Europe to continue to champion and promote free trade. Late on Friday, July 12th, Rev3 of the Global Digital Compact (GDC) dropped and went under silence procedure. In UN lingo this means that, unless one or more member states “break” silence, the GDC would be adopted as a consensus document. The deadline for anyone to “break” silence was Tuesday, July 16th at 3pm EST. Silence was broken just prior to the deadline.
The fact that silence was broken is not that surprising. The co-facilitators, Sweden and Zambia, chose to drop Rev 3 on Friday, late in the afternoon, effectively requiring capitals to read, absorb and coordinate with their New York ambassadors during the weekend. Monday was the only day, therefore, for all this to happen. And, that was simply not enough time. And, this brings me to the other point. The fact that member states ‘broke’ silence also comes to show how miscalculated was the move to call silence in the first place. All sides appear to have issues with Rev3 and what this means is that member states will now have to go back to the negotiations’ table. Quick reminder of what the GDC is The GDC is a process that was originally initiated by the UN Secretary General and, not member states. In fact, member states were preparing to discuss the issues the GDC focuses on next year, during the 20-year review of the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS). The GDC accelerated this conversation and, in doing so, it also changed much of the modus operandi on how this process would play out. The GDC is a less open and a contrived version of the multistakeholder process compared to WSIS. The GDC is part of a much larger conversation about the reform of the UN multilateral system and aims to contribute towards bringing states together in a collaborative fashion. Once agreed, it will be annexed to the Pact for the Future – a consensus-based document that is intended “to forge a new international consensus on how we deliver a better present and safeguard the future”. Rev 3 At first read, Rev3 appears to be solid. It hits all the sweet spots and uses the right words in most places (human rights, multistakeholder, etc.). It continues to be development focused, which makes it relevant and elevates its importance given the urgency in meeting the 2030 Development Targets. However, after a close read, Rev3 has a lot of issues and creates many gaps that can easily be exploited by any authoritarian government out there – the entire human rights section for instance is a gift to any country that seeks to evade its human rights obligations. Rev 3 also diminishes the role of the multistakeholder and collaborative governance and makes the GDC the main process that every UN institution and every process should be facilitating. This gives the GDC, and any organs that will be attached to it, power to determine where our digital future will be discussed and the processes that will shape it. The Good
Rev3 has explicit language on the need to develop “innovative and blended financing mechanisms” and to “invest in and deploy resilient infrastructure, including satellites and community networks…”. The recognition of blended financing is an important step towards recognizing where connectivity infrastructure investment has moved. Recognition of community networks is also a big deal as it recognizes the bottom-up and collaborative initiatives across the world that address connectivity gaps, especially persistent in small and/or marginalized communities.
Rev3 continues to retain the terms “open, global, interoperable” Internet. It is significant that these terms do not go away in any future revisions. The new term “reliable” is introduced in the text and this is one of the places where it can be misused for claiming a more state-driven notion of internet governance. It should be removed. The term “free” has also disappeared from the latest version which is unfortunate given that it seemed to have wider consensus. The Bad
Although the GDC attempts to address cross-border data flows, which has become increasingly complex over the past few years after many jurisdictions have been enforcing data localization laws, the entire data governance section is baffling. It is difficult to image how the entire section on “data exchanges and standards” will be implemented – how do you build a global data exchange system? Will governments be donating data into a global repository for access only by governments? And, how can the GDC guarantee that this access will not be abused and that is equitable?
Since the beginning, the GDC has put a lot of emphasis on AI governance. Member states have also signalled that AI is of critical importance. Both the US and China have recently led successfully separate resolutions in the UN that make this point as well as that AI is key to issues of development. Surprisingly, none of these resolutions is referenced in the GDC. Also, surprisingly, the High-Level Advisory Panel on AI discussions and report are not referenced. (The final report is not out but a leaked draft shows the inconsistencies between the GDC text and the recommendations in the report). Finally, when it comes to the governance of AI, the GDC opts for a predominantly multilateral structure. “We consider that international governance of AI requires an agile, multi-disciplinary and adaptable multistakeholder approach. We recognize that the UN has an important role to play in shaping, enabling and supporting such governance.” The word “adaptable” before multistakeholder is an attempt to dilute meaningful broader collaboration and to lock AI governance into the UN system.
Since the beginning of the GDC, one of the burning questions has been how this process will interplay with the WSIS+20 review next year. Paragraph 71 seems to address this stating that the WSIS+20 review should “identify how WSIS processes can support the implementation of the Compact”. It was always important that the GDC acknowledges the existing processes, like WSIS, and fora, like the IGF. However, the GDC gets this in reverse. The discussion should be about how the GDC serves and advances the WSIS Action Lines and the WSIS Tunis Agenda. Not the other way around. A better language could state: “We look forward to the WSIS+20 Review in 2025 to identify how WSIS processes can implement the Compact”. The ugly
In terms of multistakeholder governance, Rev3 has significantly watered-down the language on the value of multistakeholder participation. The term appears 13 times in the document and – in none of them – is there a recognition of the importance of the model for the internet and other technologies. Currently, paragraph 27 states: "We recognize that Internet governance must remain global in nature, with the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society, international organizations, technical and academic communities, and all other relevant stakeholders in accordance with their respective roles and responsibilities. We reaffirm the role of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as the primary multistakeholder platform for discussion of Internet governance issues." The text could be strengthened by adding that "Internet governance must remain global_and multistakeholder_in nature." In other places as well, like AI, the term must also be strengthened.
One of the GDC’s main selling points was its focus on human rights. The promise was that the GDC would advance human rights and would make international human rights law a core part of the document. Rev3 backtracks significantly on this promise and weakens the role human rights will end up playing in the GDC. The biggest issue has to do with the phrasing. Throughout the text, the obligations member states have, are “under international law, including international human rights law”. The word “including” is troubling and should be replaced by “and”. Adherence to international law does not equate adherence to international human rights law. What is even more frustrating is that the GDC text on human rights is not consistent with the text that is currently being negotiated in the Pact of the Future. Paragraph 11 of the Pact of the Future states: “Every commitment in this Pact is fully consistent and aligned with international law. We reaffirm the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the fundamental freedoms and protections enshrined therein and we will place human rights at the heart of our actions to implement the Pact. We will protect and promote all human rights, recognizing the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness and we will be unequivocal in what we stand for and uphold: freedom from fear and freedom from want for all without discrimination”. This text is more solid on human rights and the GDC should ensure consistency.
The GDC never fully understood the significance and role of the IGF and, in all versions, the language consistently reflected that. Whereas though the previous versions used language that was more supportive, Rev3 diminishes the IGF’s role to that of a “platform” for internet governance discussions. The IGF is a process, not a platform. It is process that is recognized in the Tunis Agenda and has been recognized by the UN’s General Assembly. It is not some platform that just discusses internet governance issues. Article 72 of the Tunis Agenda, clearly articulates the IGF’s mandate and it should guide the way the GDC talks about the IGF. Where’s the money coming from? Since the beginning of the process, one of the looming questions has been the financing of the GDC implementation. The GDC creates a number of new bodies, it calls for implementation by a swath of different stakeholders and proposes a number of new processes. This sounds expensive and lots of money will be needed. Where is this money going to come from? Who’s going to fund all these new activities? The GDC talks about private funding or philanthropy but let’s be real: the issues the GDC covers are so niche that won’t be able to attract the required financial resources. Member states will have to step in and provide some funding. Which member states will race to the start will be key. China is a likely candidate to provide funding especially given its increased interest in the UN development agenda. According to a report on China’s engagement in the UN development pillar by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability: “China’s contributions to the UN development system have grown significantly over the last decade. Its total contributions of roughly 451 million US dollars in 2020, are more than four times the size of its contributions in 2010”. Saudi Arabia can be another candidate, considering its increased interest in UN-related processes in the past few years. It is imperative that the GDC includes language that calls for transparency regarding the ‘who’ will be supporting the implementation of the GDC and its new bodies. Conclusion So far, the GDC gamble does not seem to be paying off. Digital issues are proving to be a sticking point for member state collaboration and that’s not surprising considering that for many countries they constitute part of their broader foreign policy agendas. Looking at the issues member states have broken silence over in Rev3, they may seem trivial to the untrained eye but on aggregate the GDC fails to capture the essence of collaborative governance and the role human rights should play in shaping our digital future. The Pact for the Future can still go forward without the GDC but it is unlikely at this stage that this will happen. It becomes imperative, therefore, that the GDC does not become a vehicle for changing the governance norms or that it ends up introducing new processes that can undermine the internet and the work of the communities that have supported it. Note: Unlike the Zero Draft, Rev1 and Rev2, Rev3 of the GDC is not publicly available yet. These comments are based on a leaked version of the text. The official GDC website is here: https://www.un.org/techenvoy/global-digital-compact There is an informal Ministerial Council meeting happening April 11, where telecoms ministers from the EU’s block will discuss, among others, the White Paper “How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs?”, which was published back in February.
Commissioner for Internal Market, Thierry Breton, had promised the release of a White Paper after his legislative campaign on network fees died last year. Just like he did with his proposal on network fees, he chose the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona to announce the White Paper’s release. This was not a coincidence; just like the network fees proposal, the audience of the White Paper is mainly the big five European telcos. Much like other countries around the world, Europe has set some targets for the Digital Decade. And, much like other countries around the world, these targets are ambitious. This is not necessarily a bad thing as long as Europe understands that, for achieving these goals, it will need to provide the necessary legal and economic incentives. Fostering sustainable economic, environmental and social benefits across Europe through digital transformation can only be achieved through collaboration and an ecosystem that is open, non-discriminatory and proportionate. The White Paper is nothing of sorts. There are a lot of issues in there that require the attention of everyone – spectrum allocation, critical submarine cables, development of 5G networks but there is hardly any attempt to lay down the complexity of these issues and outline the need for collaboration. It is a paper that points to the right things, yet it does so through the wrong lens. Telcos are part of the ecosystem; they are not the ecosystem. The White Paper aims at rethinking and broadening the scope of the current European electronic communications regulatory framework. One of the stated objectives is to address what is perceived as an uneven regulatory ‘level playing field’ between traditional telecom providers and cloud and other providers. The idea is to cover every provider of EU core networks and all networks on which public data transits, including a broad range of sectors and providers. The White Paper has a lot of problems in outlining a forward-looking strategy and, once again, the Commission is asking member states to buy into a half-cooked idea. The problem with this idea of course is that it will always be unconvincing because it seeks to advance telcos at the expense of an entire ecosystem – with its good actors and not so good ones. But, does this provide enough justification for the Commission to push an unpopular idea? For instance, the White Paper obviously cannot answer the impact such a drastic reordering of interconnection will have on certain networks. There are types of core networks which are private and they are currently regulated under the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) as ‘electronic communications networks’. Beyond those, depending on the interpretation of the high level wording in the White Paper, this extended scope of regulation could apply to a whole host of entities including cloud providers, content delivery networks, organisations active in the IP interconnection market and their customers, Internet Exchanges, etc. Is this really the intention? The White Paper takes aim at interconnection even though there is no evidence that the interconnection market in Europe suffers. In fact, the White Paper notes: “There are very few known cases of intervention (by a regulatory authority or by a court) into the contractual relationships between market actors, that generally functions well and so do the markets for transit and peering.” However, the Commission is making the assumption that things may change in the future. “[…], it cannot be excluded that the number of cases in the future will increase.” Making assumptions on a range of markets that have evolved very rapidly in recent years, and continue to evolve fast, is one thing. Moving from these temporary, preliminary assumptions to suggesting major regulatory changes deserves much more serious consideration, scrutiny and stakeholder debate. In order, therefore, to prevent this scenario, the White Paper suggests a whole set of changes for a host of different actors in the Internet’s infrastructure chain. For the Commission, change means regulation which would entail a number of new burdens like some form of legal interception of users’ communications, new reporting and security requirements and the likely payment of universal service fees (a form of ‘network fees’). Yes, you heard it right – all this fuss is about making sure that telcos end up getting their half-cooked and rejected “fair share” proposal. Last year, an entire European ecosystem comprised of governments, small and big businesses, civil society groups, individuals, researchers, startups – all rejected the idea of direct payments from content providers to telcos. The reactionof BEREC, the independent body of European regulators, was also clear about changing the interconnection landscape in favor of telcos: “[t]he “sending party network pays” (SPNP) model would provide ISPs the ability to exploit the termination monopoly and it is conceivable that such a significant change could be of significant harm to the internet ecosystem.” The problem with bad ideas, like the one on network fees, is that they persist almost as readily as good ideas. Bad ideas have a long life and they have the tendency to outlive their originators. This is also true in this case as Europe’s bad idea has now taken a life of its own around the world, in countries like India, Brazil and elsewhere. There is no doubt that the tension between over the role telcos should have in the infrastructure of the Internet will be one of the defining Internet policy issues for the next couple of years. The long-awaited Global Digital Compact (GDC) zero draft dropped on Monday and there is a lot in it. It requires time to absorb it all but discussions are slated to start tomorrow so time is an issue. Also, bear in mind that this is the zero draft and, by the time this process ends at the end of May, the text will look very different. This means that there is no need to panic; at least, yet.
The zero draft gives a good snapshot of where the mind of the UN (and its member states) is. Here’s my high-level take. A quick reminder… Two years ago, the United Nations’ Secretary General initiated the GDC with the aim to tackle key digital issues through the lens of multilateral reform. Some key areas of concern were identified ranging from digital connectivity, to Internet fragmentation, the protection and governance of data, the application of human rights online, the regulation of Artificial Intelligence (AI), and, how best to promote a trustworthy Internet through the introduction of accountability criteria for misleading content. For two years, the co-facilitators of the process, Sweden and Zambia, held informal and formal consultations with both governments and interested stakeholders. Almost 200 written submissions were made from all parts of the world on views about the future of the Internet and digital technologies. Stakeholders participated in formal and informal consultations organized by the co-facilitators and the GDC was a topic of conversation in both New York and Geneva as well as at ICANN and the IGF. The GDC is part of a broader UN process, the Summit for the Future, which will lead to a governmentally negotiated but not binding Pact for the Future. The Summit is scheduled for September 2024. What does the zero draft do? The zero draft is a serious proposal. It is action-oriented, specific and fairly comprehensive. It focuses on the issues the community has been asked to discuss in the past two years and comes across as a real attempt map a path forward. What does it not do? Problematically, the zero draft fails to acknowledge the historical and institutional context of Internet governance and its link to development. Even though WSIS is mentioned, the role of the ITU and the work it has done for the past twenty years in following up and promoting the WSIS Action Lines is omitted. This leaves a big gap and creates a certain degree of duplication that is not necessary. Moreover, the draft introduces the term “multistakeholder cooperation”. This is instead of the historically used terms “multistakeholder governance” or “multistakeholder approach”. I am sure this is not intentional; however, the word “cooperation” is much weaker than “governance” or “approach”. In the latter case, stakeholders are given the opportunity to steer conversations and influence outcomes. Cooperation can be much looser. The most likely explanation for these mishaps is the fact that the New York branch of the UN is responsible for the GDC. Since the beginning of this process, the choice of New York over Geneva was questioned because it is usually in Geneva where such discussions take place. The ITU, the Human Rights Council, WIPO -- all major UN bodies are in Geneva. They have the expertise. Geneva is where the food is cooked. The good. There are some good things in the draft. The reference to cross-border data flows is a pleasant surprise as we all know how key it is for an open Internet. Expect this to be one of the things that will change – the G77+China group will most certainly object to the language, especially the one that points to the Data Free Flow with Trust framework, which is a G7 initiative. Recognition of the importance of open source is the other good thing. Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) has become a focal point in the GDC and it's a good sign that the zero draft acknowledges that for DPI to be effective it must be open, interoperable, based on open standards, human rights protections – much like the Internet. The draft commits, amongst others, to the promotion of the adoption “of open standards and interoperability to facilitate the use of digital public goods across different platforms and systems”. Finally, consistent with the consultations, human rights are also a core part in the zero draft. The language is not strong enough yet it seeks to commit states to apply international law. The draft suggests that human rights must become core part of the consideration on new technologies and can help with issues of inclusion and participation, but does not make any attempt to recognise some of the work that has already been done on this at the IETF and elsewhere. The bad. The section on connectivity is disappointing. The zero draft approaches connectivity in the same monolithic way it has been approached for the past twenty years. It puts all the eggs in the private sector basket and makes industry predominantly responsible for meeting the connectivity targets. The draft disregards the limitations and the poor results this approach has had. It also disregards the new connectivity models that have emerged. For instance, there is no mention or recognition regarding the community-driven initiatives, like Community Networks, that have been prominent in the past years. Nor is there any mention on blended financing models that have proven effective in addressing connectivity gaps. The other worrying thing is the recommendation for new structures, offices and processes. In total, the zero draft recommends the creation of five new ‘things’: a) a UN Digital Human Rights Advisory Service; b) a CSTD-led intergovernmental multistakeholder process; c) a UN-led international Scientific Panel on AI; d) a $100 million Fund on AI; and, e) a dedicated office for coordinating digital and emerging technology in the Secretariat. That’s a lot. But the question is resourcing and the money they will require to be set up. It will be interesting to see which countries will be stepping in to fund or support them. The ugly. The section on Internet governance is a massive let down. There is really no language per se that should make anyone cringe but the problem is not what the zero draft says on Internet governance; the problem is what it does not say. The words we have historically used to describe the Internet: “Open”, “Global” and “Interoperable” are completely left out of the document. Instead, the zero draft reads: “Promote a universal, free and secure Internet and take concrete steps to create a safe, secure and enabling online environment”. This language should raise some red flags to the west. When it comes to the use of the words “open”, “global” and “interoperable” , we use them to identify the single Internet – the one that is decentralized and not subject to top-down control. On the contrary, words like “universal”, “free” and “secure” have been inviting broad and discretionary interpretations. For instance, China has used these terms in all kinds of contexts. The other problem is the missed opportunity to boost the IGF. The zero draft recognizes the role of the IGF but it does not attempt to use its space, its community and its knowledge. For instance, the IGF could be used as part of the follow up and implementation. The GDC draft “encourages” everyone to “engage actively in its work with a view to advancing Compact commitments on Internet governance” but beyond that there is no real attempt to assign to the IGF a more specific role. Ultimately, the zero draft is all about centralizing discussions about digital issues within the UN system. The move to NY points to that as does the idea for creating a bunch of new things under the UN umbrella, the increased role of the CSTD the draft proposes, and the language about the role of governments. One would argue that, if the broader discussion is about multilateralism, this is to be expected. But, the zero draft negates the last twenty years and how they have informed, shaped and determined much of the Internet’s evolution. Key messages for New York:
The other day, a friend asked me about the status of the network fees debate in Europe. She has been following this issue in Brazil where national regulators have been emulating the European’s Commission thinking of having content and application providers pay a fee to telecommunication operators. She knew that it was an issue I was working on and was asking whether we had managed to ‘kill it’.
The answer is ‘no’, I told her. “But we did manage to shelve it, at least for the time being”. “How great! Congratulations. Europe must feel relieved”, she continued. That’s when I paused and realized that, indeed, Europe should feel relieved. We should be relieved because the open Internet gets to live another day; and, we should be relieved because, for the time being, reason prevailed. We need to take our small wins, whenever they come and, in whatever fashion, and celebrate them. I think It is time to celebrate this small win. Occasionally, in the Internet something pretty awesome happens: an issue would pop up that would make people come together and collaborate. In my twenty years of doing Internet policy, I can remember things like the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) that made users take on the streets; the Snowden revelations that made the entire technical community come together and address surveillance; the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications, in which European telcos tried to kill network neutrality, unsuccessfully of course. The network fees discussions in Europe did just that. Without realizing it, the European Commission and the European telcos became the excuse for a highly diverse set of businesses and people from academia and civil society to come together and collaborate. Groups, like the content industry and big tech, that normally sit at opposing ends, have come together to fight the wickedness of network fees. This is remarkable and, in fact, it is the entire essence of the Internet. The Internet works better if people collaborate; for people to collaborate there needs to be a common goal; the common goal ensures that participants are focused and determined to cross boundaries and even practices; and, once they do, the outcome works for everyone and not for one individual actor. This is what Breton and the telcos failed to consider: the power of collaboration. The thinking must have been that only big tech, the direct recipient of this flawed policy, would speak up and they would easy to manage given the anti-big tech European sentiment. However, big tech was in fact the quieter voice: civil society organizations, academics, engineers, start-ups, public regulators, consumer groups and many others, we all became one voice against the European Commission and the big European telcos. This is a collective win. We should take every win, no matter how small. They don’t often come around. So, as the European Commission is preparing for its next move – in the form of a strategy paper regarding legislation for the admittedly brilliantly branded “the DNA Act” (or Digital Network Act) – we can take a moment and breathe a sigh of relief. The open and global Internet will get to live another day in Europe. |