 European capitals are right to be blunt: the idea that Europe can simply “delete” U.S. technology from its digital ecosystem is neither realistic nor desirable. As reported in Politico, policymakers increasingly acknowledge that European economies, public administrations and security infrastructures are deeply entangled with American cloud services, software stacks, semiconductors and platforms. These dependencies are not accidental, nor are they the product of European naïveté alone; they are the outcome of decades of innovation cycles, scale effects, and geopolitical alignment within the transatlantic space.
Yet realism should not be mistaken for resignation. Europe is neither numb to these dependencies nor condemned to permanent passivity. The real failure so far has not been dependency itself, but the absence of a coherent strategy for understanding, governing and gradually reshaping it. If Europe is serious about security—whether in relation to Russia, unstable neighbours, or internal resilience—it must move beyond slogans and defensive reflexes and begin doing the harder work of strategic clarity. Step One: Understanding What Dependency Really Means The first task is intellectual, not technological. Europe still lacks a granular, shared understanding of what its digital dependencies actually are. “Dependence on U.S. tech” is often treated as a monolith, when in reality it spans very different layers: cloud infrastructure, operating systems, development tools, cybersecurity services, AI models, data governance frameworks, and even tacit dependencies such as skills pipelines and venture capital norms. Some dependencies are shallow and substitutable; others are deep, systemic and reinforced by network effects. Some are commercially inconvenient but strategically tolerable; others have direct implications for national security, intelligence autonomy and crisis response. Treating all of them as equally problematic leads either to paralysis or to performative policy. From a security perspective, this distinction matters enormously. In a crisis scenario—say, heightened tensions with Russia or instability in the Eastern Mediterranean—Europe’s reliance on foreign-controlled digital infrastructure could become a strategic vulnerability. This is not only about espionage or data access. It is about continuity of service, legal jurisdiction, update control, and the ability to adapt systems rapidly under stress. Security today is not just about tanks and borders; it is about whether digital systems can be trusted to function predictably in moments of geopolitical friction. Mapping these dependencies—where they exist, how deeply embedded they are, and how feasible it is to override them—should be treated as a core security exercise, not a technocratic afterthought. This mapping should also be shared across member states, because asymmetric dependencies create internal EU fragilities. A union is only as resilient as its weakest digital link. Step Two: From Defensive Posture to Strategic Direction The second step is decisional. Europe has spent the past decade reacting—regulating platforms, blocking mergers, erecting defensive legal frameworks—without articulating a clear sense of where it actually wants to go. The term “digital sovereignty” has become a catch-all that signals concern without conveying intent. Sovereignty over what, exactly? For whom? And to what end? Increasingly, digital sovereignty is being associated with open source, and this is a welcome development. Open source reduces lock-in, increases transparency, and allows for collective scrutiny—important virtues in a security-conscious environment. However, open source is not a panacea. Code that is open but poorly governed, underfunded or fragmented can be just as fragile as proprietary alternatives. Moreover, open source alone does not solve questions of scale, liability, or long-term maintenance. A more mature strategy would treat open source as one pillar among several. Europe should also actively promote open standards and protocols, insisting on interoperability as a default condition in both public procurement and regulation. Interoperability is not just a competition tool; it is a security mechanism. Systems that can be swapped, recombined and reconfigured are harder to coerce and easier to defend. Decentralised architectures deserve particular attention. In a geopolitical environment marked by hybrid threats, centralisation is a liability. Decentralised systems—whether in data storage, identity management or communications—reduce single points of failure and make large-scale disruption more difficult. For countries with “tricky neighbours,” such as Greece or the Baltic states, this kind of architectural resilience is not theoretical; it is existential. Security Beyond Russia: The Full Spectrum While Russia understandably dominates European security thinking, a broader lens is needed. Europe’s digital vulnerabilities intersect with migration pressures, energy dependencies, supply-chain disruptions, and internal political polarisation. In the Eastern Mediterranean, for example, digital infrastructure has become entangled with energy exploration, maritime surveillance and military posturing. In such contexts, dependence on external digital systems can constrain diplomatic and military flexibility. Cybersecurity itself is no longer a niche domain. Ransomware attacks on hospitals, interference with electoral infrastructure, and manipulation of information spaces all sit at the intersection of digital dependency and societal security. Europe’s response cannot rely solely on regulation and incident response; it must include structural choices about how systems are built and governed. Creating the Right Incentives—and the Right Governance None of this will happen without investment, and investment will not flow into an environment perceived as hostile, unpredictable or ideologically confused. Europe needs a framework that is predictable, proportionate, rights-based and consistent—not just across policy areas, but across time. Constant regulatory churn may feel active, but it discourages long-term commitment. In addition to funding and regulation, Europe should experiment with new incentives: security-weighted public procurement, long-term public-private partnerships for critical digital infrastructure, and “resilience premiums” that reward architectures designed for interoperability and decentralisation. These tools would signal that Europe values not just innovation, but durable and secure innovation. Finally, governance matters. Europe’s current digital governance is fragmented across institutions, policy silos and national competencies. A credible strategy would require a standing governance structure that brings together security agencies, digital regulators, industrial policy actors and foreign policy expertise. This body should not micro-manage technology, but it should set priorities, coordinate dependency assessments, and stress-test Europe’s digital ecosystem against plausible geopolitical scenarios. Crucially, governance must also include mechanisms for learning and adaptation. Digital security is not static. A system that is resilient today may be brittle tomorrow. Europe’s strength should lie in its ability to adjust collectively, rather than to cling to fixed models. Conclusion European capitals are correct: cutting off U.S. technology is neither realistic nor necessary. But accepting dependency without strategy is equally untenable. In a world of renewed geopolitical tension and hybrid threats, Europe’s digital choices are security choices. The path forward is not technological autarky, but strategic intentionality—grounded in a clear understanding of dependencies, a coherent vision of where Europe wants to go, and governance structures capable of turning that vision into reality. Comments are closed.
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