 This analysis compares and critiques the national submissions to the WSIS+20 review process, focusing on human rights, data governance, AI, Internet governance, and financing mechanisms. The analysis covers the positions of Russia, China, the G77 (including Brazil) and contrasts them with those of the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.
The WSIS+20 process revisits global commitments made two decades ago to build a people-centered, inclusive, and development-oriented information society. Yet, as these submissions reveal, the global consensus on how to achieve those goals has fractured. The same ideological and geopolitical rift visible in the WSIS+10 Review (2015) has not only persisted but deepened, turning the review into a proxy arena for broader struggles over digital sovereignty, development, and control. There are no real surprises in how the lines have been drawn: the Russia–China–G77 bloc continues to advance a state-centric and sovereignty-based vision of digital governance, while the EU, U.S., U.K., Canada, and Australia hold fast to a rights-based, multistakeholder model. But what has changed is the balance of influence and the political meaning of that divide. The sovereignty narrative, once seen as defensive or exclusionary, is now framed as a legitimate corrective to Western dominance, couched in the language of equity, development, and fairness. China’s role as de facto coordinator of the G77 on digital issues has amplified this framing, giving coherence and diplomatic weight to a position that was far more fragmented at WSIS+10. Moving forward, this shift has two profound implications. First, for the WSIS process itself, which increasingly finds itself in competition with the Global Digital Compact (GDC) and related UN initiatives. The GDC is emerging as a rival locus for digital norm-setting and, as a result, the WSIS process risks being perceived as outdated, Western-anchored, and institutionally rigid. Second, for the open Internet paradigm, the consequences are even more structural. The deepening divide means that the global Internet is no longer governed by a shared baseline of principles, but rather by competing philosophical orders: one grounded in open connectivity, interoperability, and universal rights; the other in sovereign control, state-led development, and managed interdependence. As more countries in the Global South align with the latter — often motivated by legitimate development concerns — the “open Internet” model risks losing its normative universality. Instead of a single global Internet governed by common rules, the world is drifting toward a pluralized digital order, in which governance is increasingly territorial, data regimes are nationally bounded, and interoperability becomes a matter of political negotiation rather than technical default. In this context, the WSIS+20 process is not merely a review of past commitments — it is a referendum on the future of global digital governance. Its outcomes will signal whether the multistakeholder ethos of openness and rights can adapt to the new development-sovereignty paradigm or whether the global community will pivot toward a more intergovernmental, state-managed digital system. Either way, the paradigm is shifting — from a focus on governance of the Internet to governance through the Internet, where digital systems themselves become instruments of geopolitical power and developmental leverage. Human Rights. The Western bloc — the EU, the US, UK, Canada, and Australia — maintains a clear and consistent line: human rights offline must be protected online. Their submissions affirm universal rights, accountability mechanisms, and the centrality of civil society and independent oversight. The EU submission explicitly cites the UDHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, calling for “rights-based and human-centric AI governance” and safeguards against mass surveillance and Internet shutdowns. The United States reinforces these themes but in a more reserved tone. Its submission underscores the need for transparency, freedom of expression, and private-sector responsibility, yet it lacks the expansive moral rhetoric that characterized the US’s previous“Internet Freedom” agenda. The tone is managerial — reaffirming rather than reimagining. By contrast, Russia, China, and the G77 invoke human rights but frame them differently. The G77 text reaffirms universality but situates rights within the context of development, state capacity, and national sovereignty. China and Russia continue to interpret rights through the lens of non-interference, emphasizing that states have primary responsibility for maintaining “public order” and “information security.” In practice, this formulation legitimizes strong regulatory and surveillance powers. The result is a familiar tension: agreement on human rights in principle but deep disagreement over implementation and enforcement. The Western bloc treats human rights as constraints on state action — legal limits to government power, guaranteed by multistakeholder oversight and individual recourse. Russia, China, and many G77 members, on the other hand, treat human rights as objectives to be realized through state authority and developmental policy. For them, rights are not merely protections from the state but promises that require an active state to deliver. What makes this moment distinct is how China has turned this framing into a strategic narrative advantage. By linking rights discourse to tangible outcomes — connectivity, access, education, and economic opportunity — Beijing presents a model that resonates across the Global South. Its message is pragmatic and politically astute: that “development is the foundation of human rights,” and that sovereignty and stability are prerequisites for inclusion. This rhetoric allows China to appear constructive and empathetic, while Western actors often sound abstract, legalistic, or moralizing. Meanwhile, the Western coalition’s messaging has grown increasingly disconnected from political realities. By emphasizing universal rights without addressing structural inequities — financing gaps, infrastructure deficits, and the legacy of digital colonialism — it inadvertently reinforces the perception that its model serves the already-connected. Even more damaging is the widening credibility gap: Western governments that promote freedom of expression and privacy abroad are simultaneously criticized for domestic practices that undermine those same values. This perceived hypocrisy weakens the persuasive power of Western human rights advocacy and strengthens China’s developmental framing. For many developing countries, the Western message no longer offers a viable path to digital empowerment; it feels like conditionality without delivery. In contrast, the China–G77 approach, though more state-centric, seems to offer agency — the promise that governments can shape digital transformation according to national priorities rather than external expectations. If this rhetorical dynamic continues, the global conversation on human rights online could tilt decisively toward the “sovereign developmental” paradigm, where legitimacy is measured less by legal conformity and more by tangible social outcomes. In such a world, China’s framing — that human rights flow from state-led development — risks becoming the new normative baseline, while the Western rights-based model is relegated to rhetorical defense rather than strategic leadership. However, insisting on human rights is more vital today than ever. As digital systems continue to mediate access to information, opportunity, and power, safeguarding fundamental freedoms remains essential to any credible vision of an inclusive information society. But the challenge for the Western bloc is not the principle of rights itself; it is the narrative and delivery. To regain moral and political traction, Western actors must learn to address human rights in ways that are responsive to the needs of the entire world, effectively framing rights not as abstract legal ideals but as practical enablers of development, dignity, and self-determination. This means connecting human rights discourse to tangible commitments: equitable access, financing, capacity-building, and technology transfer. Only by translating values into deliverables can the West make its human-rights narrative both authentic and relatable to those for whom digital inclusion is not yet a given. Data Governance The divide in data governance mirrors the human-rights debate. The EU and allied countries stress interoperability, privacy, and responsible data flows, echoing the principles of the GDPR. They argue that trust in digital systems depends on consistent, human-rights-based frameworks. The EU’s submission explicitly calls for “interoperable, rights-protecting data governance mechanisms.” Meanwhile, the G77 and Brazil emphasize equity and sovereignty. Their submissions call for new UN-supported mechanisms on data governance, including technical assistance and capacity-building for developing countries. Data is framed as a developmental resource — something that should serve national priorities and economic growth. Russia and China go further, embedding data governance in their long-standing advocacy for “cyber sovereignty.” Both insist that states must have the right to regulate domestic data and information flows to protect national interests. The G77’s framing is subtle but strategic: it combines legitimate calls for capacity-building with language that preserves the right to localize or restrict data flows. This duality makes their position politically resonant among developing countries while leaving ample space for state-centric governance. Artificial Intelligence In the field of AI governance, both camps acknowledge the need for international cooperation — but again diverge on who leads. The Western submissions call for AI governance anchored in transparency, accountability, and independent oversight. The EU in particular insists on human oversight and lifecycle accountability, echoing its internal AI Act framework. The emphasis is on safeguards, not control. The G77 and Brazil strongly advocate for the meaningful inclusion of developing countries in global AI and digital governance processes, emphasizing equity, capacity-building, and technology transfer. China echoes this position, aligning with the G77 in calling for governance frameworks that directly address the developmental needs and priorities of the Global South. Russia and China, meanwhile, favor intergovernmental coordination over multistakeholder models, cautioning against “fragmentation” — a term often used to signal opposition to Western dominance in standards-setting and policy leadership. The difference lies in philosophy: Western actors trust distributed networks of governance (industry, academia, civil society); G77 and sovereignty advocates prefer central coordination under UN auspices. Internet Governance This remains the core battleground. The Western bloc defends the multistakeholder model and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as the central platform for dialogue. Their submissions describe the IGF as an inclusive and flexible mechanism that has delivered results without the rigidity of intergovernmental control. They warn explicitly against “state-controlled or fragmented Internet architectures.” Enhanced cooperation continues to be a fault-line. Whereas the co-facilitators tried to defuse tensions around “enhanced cooperation” with language designed to appease multiple camps, the G77, alongside China and Russia, repeatedly insist on the term, signaling a deliberate effort to keep the debate alive. By framing the system as Western-led and private-sector dominated, they cast it as a failure — a narrative that exaggerates weaknesses and ignores the fact that, in practice, the system has, majorly, delivered meaningful coordination. Their push for state-centered governance and stronger UN coordination also overlooks a key reality: in today’s polarized geopolitical environment, “enhanced cooperation” is unlikely to solve the problems states cite and risks producing gridlock, a dynamic poorly suited to the pace of technological development. Enhanced cooperation is a concept the global south rightly values—but the way China and Russia insist on it points not to collaboration but to division. Their push lacks concrete proposals for how states can actually work together on digital governance; instead, it serves as a wedge, deepening geopolitical fault lines. Creating new UN mechanisms is, in reality, unfeasible today: financial constraints are severe, no one is eager to fund them, and we should be cautious of China or Russia leading the charge. At this stage, “enhanced cooperation” without practical guidance is less about solutions and more about shaping the debate to their advantage. This remains the core battleground. What is more interesting though is Brazil, often a bridge between the two camps, leans toward the G77 position in this cycle. Its submission, though mentioning the multistakeholder model, echoes calls for strengthened intergovernmental coordination while reiterating support for human rights — an attempt to harmonize development and rights language. Finally, the IGF enjoys broad recognition as a valuable forum, but support for its permanent status is cautious, particularly among China, Russia, and the G77. Both China and Russia favor intergovernmental coordination and “reserve” judgment on formalizing the IGF, signaling a desire to keep leverage over governance design rather than cede influence to a permanent multistakeholder body. The G77 similarly uses careful language, championing developing-country inclusion while stopping short of endorsing permanence outright — a stance that may reflect strategic positioning, leaving open the possibility of treating the IGF’s status as a bargaining chip in broader digital governance negotiations. Financing Mechanisms Here, the G77’s position is both politically powerful and substantively justified. Developing countries call for new concessional and sustainable financing mechanisms, technology transfer, and capacity-building to enable digital inclusion. Their argument is straightforward: without financing, all talk of inclusion is rhetorical. The Western submissions, by contrast, rely on market-led approaches and public-private partnerships. They stress innovation and investment climates rather than public financing. The EU and U.S. support capacity-building but stop short of committing to new funding mechanisms. This imbalance fuels the sovereignty narrative. When the G77 calls for financial justice, and the West offers governance lectures instead, the moral terrain shifts toward the Global South. APC has offered some thoughts on the issue of financing mechanisms and the way forward. Comparative Perspective: WSIS+10 vs WSIS+20 The WSIS+10 outcome in 2015 already exposed the underlying tension between multistakeholderism and multilateralism, yet there was a sense that these differences could be managed. Optimism at the time stemmed from two key developments. First, there was widespread faith in the potential of inclusive, multistakeholder governance to balance the interests of governments, the private sector, and civil society. Second, the IANA transition—the symbolic transfer of critical Internet infrastructure stewardship from U.S. control to the global multistakeholder community—was seen as a landmark achievement, signaling that governance could evolve cooperatively without exacerbating geopolitical rivalries. In this context, even when states disagreed on principles or procedures, the broader narrative was one of cautious optimism and potential convergence. Ten years on, the landscape has changed dramatically. The early hope that inclusive governance could bridge divides has eroded. Geopolitical competition has intensified, with major powers increasingly framing digital governance through the lens of strategic advantage rather than collaboration. The field itself is more fragmented: new players, both state and non-state, have emerged, and digital infrastructure and policy debates now intersect directly with national security, economic influence, and technological sovereignty. The stakes for institutional authority have grown accordingly. The G77 has become more cohesive, presenting a unified front that amplifies the voices of developing countries while aligning strategically with China and, in some instances, Russia. Western consensus, once a stabilizing factor in multistakeholder forums, has weakened under internal divisions and differing national priorities. Meanwhile, China’s diplomatic approach has matured into full-spectrum coordination: Beijing now integrates digital governance into its broader geopolitical strategy, leveraging trade, infrastructure, and development agendas to reinforce its position. As a result, familiar phrases—“enhanced cooperation,” “development-oriented governance,” “human rights online”—carry sharper geopolitical resonance. Where they once suggested broad, shared aspirations, today they function as coded signals: markers of alignment, instruments of leverage, and tools to assert influence in contested arenas. The discourse is no longer merely technical or procedural; it has become a proxy battlefield where conceptual framing itself shapes power and legitimacy in global Internet governance. Final Assessment — Geopolitical Reading and Outlook This analysis has focused on the EU, U.S., UK, Canada, and Australia versus Russia, China, the G77, and Brazil. While the alignments are familiar, the fault lines are deeper. The Western bloc defends a rights-based, open, and multistakeholder Internet order. The Russia–China–G77 axis, increasingly coordinated by China, advances an intergovernmental, sovereignty-based framework couched in the rhetoric of equity and inclusion. But it is in the United States where the shift is most noticeable. While there is continuity, it comes with subtle signs of retrenchment. The U.S. submission merits particular attention. It maintains the core multistakeholder message but reveals a shift from leadership to maintenance. In contrast to the proactive diplomacy of the previous administrations — when Internet freedom was a foreign policy priority and the U.S. led global governance initiatives — the WSIS+20 input is notably conservative. Gone is the ambitious rhetoric about “expanding digital freedom.” The text defends existing mechanisms rather than proposing new ones, and it offers little in the way of development financing or capacity-building. The shift reflects a broader U.S. turn toward techno-nationalism: prioritizing domestic AI champions, shaping data and competition rules at home, and leveraging its companies’ global reach as a tool of influence rather than investing in multilateral leadership. This restrained tone risks making the U.S. appear reactive in a landscape where China and Russia are advancing proactive, development-led narratives. Without renewed engagement or material commitments, Washington may struggle to persuade the Global South of its messaging. Deepening divides and difficult negotiations ahead Negotiations toward WSIS+20 are poised to be contentious, and with the clock ticking, failure carries real risks. The review must produce a forward-looking text that meaningfully builds on the 2015 outcome. Simply recycling the WSIS+10 language would be a lost opportunity—especially as WSIS directly competes with the GDC. A stagnant WSIS document risks irrelevance, unable to address today’s geopolitical realities. We need a new text, an advanced text, one that demonstrates evolution—particularly within this compressed timeframe. The gaps between camps are substantial, spanning human rights, AI, Internet governance, and financing. A compromise reaffirming both multistakeholderism and “enhanced cooperation” is possible, but it would likely be a semantic truce rather than genuine convergence. China’s coordination of the G77 has become a defining factor. By framing sovereignty in terms of development and fairness, Beijing presents its position as constructive rather than defensive, enhancing its influence across the Global South. In contrast, Western actors remain rhetorically assertive but politically cautious, reluctant to connect human rights with financial redistribution or infrastructure support—a dynamic already evident in the GDC process, where China successfully employed the same approach. Meanwhile, the G77 now articulates the priorities of the developing world more convincingly than the West. Its submissions are grounded in concrete realities—financing, infrastructure, inclusion—issues the EU and U.S. often treat as secondary. This asymmetry in both empathy and substance could shape the narrative balance of the final WSIS+20 outcome, determining whether the process yields real progress or merely a symbolic statement. The West should double down on what works: defend multistakeholderism, invest in the IGF, and lead by example in linking technology, human rights, and development. Crucially, it must genuinely listen to the Global South—understand their priorities, fund inclusive initiatives, and support digital capacity-building—just as China does, but with transparency and accountability. Influence through innovation, credibility, and partnership, not coercion. In this fragmented landscape, the West wins by proving that open, cooperative governance delivers results faster, fairer, and smarter than state-centered alternatives. Broader Conclusions
Final Reflection WSIS+20 reveals a world in digital bifurcation. The liberal, open Internet championed by the West persists as a normative aspiration, but the sovereignty-based, development-led model championed by China and the G77 is gaining political legitimacy. Unless the Western coalition reclaims strategic initiative by coupling its normative agenda with credible, financed commitments to inclusion and capacity-building, the balance of global digital governance will tilt decisively toward state-centric control. In the short time remaining before the WSIS+20 outcome, negotiators face not just a text but a choice of paradigms: an Internet governed through distributed participation and rights, or one managed through state authority and equitable development claims. Both will coexist, but the question is which model will inspire the majority of the world’s population. Comments are closed.
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